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1 Introduction
In most schooling systems, education is accumulated through successive
steps conditional on completion of a lower schooling level. There is there-
fore rarely any di¤erence in educational attainment among a cross-section of
individuals currently attending the same education (grade) level. However,
this is not the case in post-schooling training participation, where educa-
tional background may di¤er widely across participants. For this reason, it
is natural to investigate whether the incidence of training and its e¤ect on
wages depends on schooling.
This question motivates the current paper. More precisely, we estimate
the e¤ect of training on post-training wage outcomes in a context where
individual returns depend on permanent individual-specic heterogeneity
and on the level of schooling achieved by the individual.
The issue of possible correlation between individual returns to training
and accumulated schooling is far from new. In a series of papers (i.a. Heck-
man 2000, Carneiro and Heckman 2003, Knudsen et al. 2006, and Cunha
and Heckman 2007), Heckman and co-authors argue that complementarity
in learning exists. Skill formation is a dynamic process with strong synergies
that lead early investments to promote later investments: skill begets skill.
In a dynamic skill accumulation model, complementarity may take at
least two distinct forms. First, accumulated skills may decrease the psychic
cost of investing in further skill accumulation. In such a case, individual age
earnings proles would tend to display positive correlation between school-
ing and post-schooling wage growth, even if the wage regression is separa-
ble in education and experience (or any post-schooling training activities).
However, with data on earnings, schooling and training decisions, the econo-
metrician would be able to estimate the returns to education and training
within a classical (separable) Mincer wage equation.
A second type of dynamic skill accumulation model would arise if, for a
given level of individual permanent endowments, the wage gain associated
with training participation depends on accumulated schooling. In such a
case, schooling would also magnify the e¤ect of post-schooling human cap-
ital investments. However, for a given level of skill endowment, the wage
equation would no longer be linearly separable in schooling and training. As
a result, the returns to additional training will be higher for individuals with
a relatively high formal schooling, say a college degree, vis-à-vis individuals
with a lower level of education, say high school.
In both cases, the policy implications of complementarity are important
and far-reaching: Investment in early childhood +development is more cost-
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e¤ective all else equal, vis-à-vis seeking to upgrade qualications of unskilled
adult workers. As there exists a widespread belief that OECD countries have
experienced a rapid shift in demand toward more skilled workers, the impli-
cations of the studies sited above are very important for how to e¤ectively
design policies that deal with this shift in demand of skilled labor.1
At a pure econometric level, estimating the e¤ects of training on wages
is relatively complicated. Because both training and schooling decisions are
potentially a¤ected by individual permanent endowments, IV estimation,
typically based on the availability of policy shocks (or natural experiments),
is ill-equipped to tackle this issue. Indeed, IV estimation is usually associ-
ated to the notion of Local Average Treatment E¤ect (LATE), which was in-
troduced by Imbens and Angrist (1994). If the dispersion of individual wage
gains reects di¤erences in schooling as well as di¤erences in skills (which
would be the case if there is complementarity), classical IV would hardly
be able to disentangle the causal e¤ect of schooling from the heterogeneity
component. Because the LATE is an average return for a sub-population
a¤ected by a policy change (the instrument), it is not even clear that such an
estimate would be of any help in determining the incidence (or the degree)
of complementarity between schooling and training.2
In this paper, we focus on dynamic skill accumulation that takes the
form of a causal e¤ect of education level on individual private returns (wage
gains) to training participation. We investigate the degree of complementar-
ity between formal schooling level and MBA-type of training (described in
detail in section 2.3). To this end, we use data from Danish administrative
employer-employee records spanning from 1980 to 2003 and condition the
sample on participants with highest completed formal schooling in one of
two levels. Level 1 includes high school degree or some (partly) vocational
education at an equivalent level (12-13 years) while Level 2 consists of peo-
ple with at least a bachelor degree or its equivalence (15 years or more).
This provides us with a unique opportunity to analyze heterogeneity and
complementarity in returns to training between di¤erent skills groups. We
do this by estimating the returns to training using a structural model of the
1Heckman and co-authors are not the only scholars nding results in support of comple-
mentarity, see e.g. Shaw (1989) and Meghir and Palme (2005). However, complementarity
in learning has not gone unchallenged. For instance, Krueger (2003) argues for the opposite
view that returns to training are at least as big at the bottom of the income distribution
as at the top.
2The empirical relevance of the LATE parameter is not unanymously recognized.
For instance, several economists have claimed that the LATE parameter is not policy-
relevant for a variety of reasons, see e.g. Heckman and Vytlacil (2007).
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training decision, in which the wage equation is formulated in a correlated
random coe¢ cient wage regression model (CRCWRM) in the vein of Belzil
and Hansen (2007).
The main nding of the paper is the existence of complementarity be-
tween schooling and training. More precisely, we nd that individual returns
(wage gains) to training are magnied by individual schooling level. The re-
sults therefore indicate a dynamic causal e¤ect of schooling and imply that
the standard representation of the Mincer wage equation, which is built on
an assumption of separability between schooling and training, may be er-
roneous.3 While it is not clear that the result regarding complementarity
may be extrapolated to all possible post-schooling investment decisions, we
believe that one of the major contribution of this paper is the development
of a methodology that address possible non-separability between the e¤ects
of schooling and post-schooling human capital investments on wages.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the
Danish data that have been used to implement our model. The setup of the
behavioral model is found in section 3. The estimation strategy is discussed
in section 4 while the parameter estimates are presented in section 5. Section
6 provides a discussion of the main ndings while section 7 concludes the
paper.
2 Data
2.1 Danish Register Data
Data come from administrative records maintained by Statistics Denmark.
The records constitute a longitudinal database that contains information
about all individuals aged 15 to 74 (demographic characteristics, education,
labor market experience, tenure and earnings) and employees in all work-
places in Denmark during the period 1980-2003. Persons and workplaces
are matched at the end of November each year. Consequently, only changes
of employment November-to-November are accounted for, not intervening
changes.
The database has been merged with a course register database that con-
tains information on all government co-sponsored formal training courses,
vocational as well as classroom training. This register includes detailed in-
formation on the business training program described below.
3The misspecication of the Mincer equation has already been noted in Heckman et
al. (2003), as well as in Belzil (2007)
4
2.2 The Training Program
We analyze the e¤ects of a government co-sponsored training program in
business administration4, which has a long tradition in Denmark dating
back more than 50 years and until recently this training program was the
only MBA-type training program available in Denmark. The curriculum
consists of studies in business economics with classes taking place in the
evening (or in a few instances on weekends). The designed course load is
equivalent to two yearsfull-time studies, divided into two parts of equal size.
It is possible to stop after Part I but a diploma is obtained after completion
of the second part only5. The program is considered as training although it
clearly has some academic component to it and as such is close in nature to
education and (most) participants work full-time both during Part I as well
as Part II of the program.6
In Part I of the program, students are introduced to fundamental theo-
ries and methods in social science. The minimum educational background
required in order to be eligible to enter Part I is a high school degree.
Part II of the program includes more in-depth studies in some eld of
business economics.7 Students who have completed Part I successfully and
who have a minimum of two years (full-time equivalents) of relevant work
experience are eligible for Part II.
In this paper, the sample is restricted to individuals who have completed
Part I of the program and we model their decision to either stop after Part
I or continue (perhaps after one or more sabatical years) with Part II of
the program. As mentioned in the introduction, we select individuals who
belong to one of two levels of education; High School or College and above.8
2.3 Descriptive Statistics
We limit our sample to males, born 1960-1970 who completed Part I of
the training program before 1989. We follow these individuals from the
time they complete Part I and as long as we observe them in the data.
4 In Danish called Handelsdiplomaor simply HD.
5So the Handelsdiploma (HD) requires Completion of both Part I and Part II.
6 In the nomenclature applied by Statistics Denmark this course is dened as post-
schooling training. Furthermore, it takes place in the evening time and is attended by
full-time workers as many other types of training.
7Possible elds include: Finance, Organization, Accounting, Logistics & Supply Chain
Management, Financial Counselling and Retail & Key Account Management.
8As the focus here is on complementarity it is not necessary to model selection into
Part I as well. Such an extension would not be trivial since the duration of part I also can
be of various length.
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By conditioning on cohorts born 1960 or later, keeping in mind that the
register database starts in 1980, we ensure that we observe individuals in
our sample from around the time their labor market experience potentially
starts accumulating (around age 19-20).
This leaves us with a sample of about 3,500 individuals (54,000 obser-
vations) of which 2,654 individuals have no schooling beyond high school
while 857 individuals have completed college or more, cf. Table 1. About
75 percent choose to continue with Part II.
[Table 1 about here]
Looking at the raw wage di¤erences between individuals who select into
Part II of the training versus those who only take Part I reveals that the
median wage among those who complete Part II is markedly higher than
those who do not, cf. Figure 1. Of course, this does not convey any infor-
mation about whether this is an e¤ect of training or purely a sign of positive
selection of the most able and motivated.
[Figure 1 about here]
In formulating our structural model, we need to know the approximate
time between completion of Part I and start of Part II (if ever entering). Not
surprisingly, Figure 2 shows that about 90 percent of those who continue
do so immediately, whereas the remaining participants enroll within the
following two years. Likewise, the model takes into account the fact that
duration of Part II of the training program, although it typically takes two
years, may stretch over 4-5 years, cf. Figure 3.9
[Figures 2 and 3 about here]
From the data we can observe that the reason for prolonged duration for
many training participants is not that they fail to pass exams but rather
that they deliberately choose a less intensive course-load and for this reason
stretch the duration over more than two years. This observation is taken
into account when we estimate the probability that it takes more than two
years to complete Part II.
9As can be seen from Figures 2 and 3 there is virtually no di¤erence between the two
education groups in their "time to enrol" and "time to complete".
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3 A Structural Dynamic Model
As mentioned above, we consider individuals who have completed Part I of
the training program, and we model their decision to continue in the training
program (to enter Part II) or not. Every decision is made at the beginning
of each period.
3.1 The Model
3.1.1 Choice Set
Individuals are assumed to be rational and forward-looking. In every period,
they make choices in order to maximize their expected net present value of
utility until they retire.
In our model, the choice set is very simple. Upon completion of Part I of
the training program, individuals have to decide whether to continue with
the second part of the program or not. All choices are made within the rst
three years after completion of Part I, but workers may be active in training
up to and including period 5 in the model. Di¤erences in training duration
mainly reect individual choices of various intensity levels (and not failure
to pass exams).
3.1.2 Utility of Work
The instantaneous utility from work, denoted UW (), is set equal to the real
gross log wages, ln wit. As the individuals in our sample experience only
very low degrees of unemployment, we model their career paths as if they
are full-time employed in every period. The log wage received by individual
i in period t is given by
UWit () = ln wit = '1iTRit + '2Experit + (1)
'3Exper
2
it + iIi;college + 
W
i + "
W
it ;
where Icollege is an indicator which equals 1 if the individual has a col-
lege degree (including bachelors and masters) and zero otherwise, i is an
individual-specic parameter, TRit is an indicator for having completed Part
II of the training, '1i is the individual-specic wage return to training, and
'2 and '3 measure the e¤ects of experience and experience squared. Unob-
served heterogeneity is accommodated both through the individual specic
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intercept term, wi , and through the returns to education, training and ed-
ucation and training interacted (the complementarity term). Finally, "Wit
represents idiosyncratic stochastic wage shocks.
The individual-specic returns to training can be written as
'1i = Ii;college  'ci + !1i
where the term 'ci is an unrestricted type i specic parameter that rep-
resents the di¤erence in returns to training for those with a college degree
relative to those with a high school diploma. A positive 'ci would imply
that schooling has a causal e¤ect on the return to training and it could
be interpreted as evidence in favor of complementarity in learning. At this
stage, it is important to note that, in general, !1i is correlated with Ii;college :
Note also that because college attendance is a¤ected by individual het-
erogeneity, the di¤erence between actual training returns of high school grad-
uates and college graduates would generally be di¤erent from 'ci:
3.1.3 Utility of Training Participation
Non-pecuniary utility is measured in monetary equivalents and enters the
model as utility of learning and utility of leisure (disutility of loss of leisure),
and these utility components are allowed to depend on a series of observable
covariates which, following Belzil and Hansen (2002, 2003 and 2007), enter
the model exogenously.
The per-period utility of selecting into the second part of the training is
therefore given by
UTRit = X
TR
it + 
TR
i + "
TR
it (2)
The matrix of covariates, XTRit , includes age and age squared, marital
status, number of children and local labor market conditions, i.e. the local
unemployment rate (by education group, gender, and age) across time. It
also includes an indicator for whether college is completed or not and tu-
ition fee. Lastly, the utility of training participation depends on unobserved
individual heterogeneity, TRi , orthogonal to observed covariates while "
TR
it
represents idiosyncratic stochastic shocks.
The unobserved utility component, TRi , captures unobserved hetero-
geneity which arises if individuals are endowed with di¤erent unobserved
pre-training skills or di¤er in terms of their intrinsic motivation. The term
may also capture idiosyncratic knowledge about the time and e¤ort required
for completion of the training. Each of these utility components can not be
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separately identied so we think of TRi as the combined net outcome of
unobserved factors.
3.1.4 The Stochastic Shocks
We assume that the random shocks ("TRit , "
W
it ) are normally distributed
and independent of each other as well as independent of training, formal
schooling and experience.
3.1.5 The Utility Function
The instantaneous utility is given as the sum of equation 1 and equation 2
Uit = U
W
it + Id=1  UTRit ; (3)
where the components of UW () and UTR() are specied above. The choice
variable, d, equals 1 if the individual chooses to continue with Part II of the
training program, and zero otherwise.
3.2 Solving the Problem
3.2.1 The Optimization Problem and Solution Method
For sake of clarity, the state space is partitioned into two components. The
rst one, sit, includes period-specic idiosyncratic random shocks to utility
("TRit ; "
W
it ), accumulated experience (Experit), and schooling (Icollege ) for
individual i at time t. The second one, TRit, is equal to 1 if individual i has
completed Part II in period t, and 0 if not.
The law of motion implies that the state variable, TRit; equals 0 until
the training course is actually completed.
Suppose that the decision to enter Part II is made at the beginning of
period t: As individuals face two options, two value functions have to be
specied. First, the value function of choosing full-time work and foregoing
the training opportunity at time t (denoted V Wit (:)); is simply
V Wit (:) = U
W
it (sit; TRit = 0) + EVi;t+1(sit+1; TRit+1 = 0)
where EVi;t+1 is the expected maximum utility, cf. below.
Consistent with the data, assume that the second part of the training
period always last at least two periods. In order to capture the intrinsic
randomness in the time needed to complete the program, we introduce a
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continuation probability, ; which represents the probability that the train-
ing program will have a duration beyond two years. This probability is
parameterized simply as
 = (Xdurit  + 
dur
i )
where (:) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, Xdurit
includes experience and duration of Part I and duri is unobserved hetero-
geneity correlated with other components (i; 'ci; !1i; 
TR
i ; 
W
i ):
The value function associated with the decision to work full-time and
continue with Part II of the training program (dt = 1) or not, denoted
V TRit (sit); can be expressed by the Bellman equation
V TRit (sit) = U
TR
it (sit; TRit = 0) + EfV TRi;t+1(sit+1; TRit+1 = 0)g (4)
where
E(V TRit+1 j sit+1; TRit+1 = 0) = UTRit+1(sit+1; TRit+1 = 0) +
f[(1  ) EV Wit+2(sit+2; TRit+2 = 1) +
  EV TRit+2(sit+2; TRit+2 = 0)]g
With probability (1  ) he completes Part II in period t+2, while with
probability  the training lasts an additional period.10
The optimal value function, at date t; is
EVit(:) = EMAXfV TRit (:); V Wit (:)g
The optimal choice is found using backward induction. Once an individ-
ual enters into Part II of the training program, he will complete the training
in either 2 or 3 periods. In this sense, his outcome is deterministic and the
problem can be seen as an optimal stopping problem: once a person enters
the training program, there are no more choices to be made. Alternatively,
if he does not enter in period t, he has the option of entering in the next
period. In Appendix A, we include a more formal explanation of how to
compute the EMAX used in the backward recursions.
10From data we observe that Part II sometimes lasts more than three periods. Any
duration beyond two periods is lumped together here.
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4 Estimation
4.1 The Initial Condition
Although we are not modeling schooling explicitly, it is still important to
allow for the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity to be arbitrarily cor-
related with college completion. This is because individual permanent en-
dowments that may help explain training participation are also likely to
have played a role in schooling choices. As a consequence, we formulate the
schooling decision as a binary probit equation which also depends on unob-
served heterogeneity. That is, the probability of initially having completed
college, is simply
(XSi  + 
S
i )
where (:) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, XSi
includes mothers and fathers highest completed education and Si is unob-
served heterogeneity correlated with other components (i; 'ci; !1i; 
TR
i ; 
W
i ;
duri ):
4.2 Unobserved Heterogeneity
As is customary in this type of models, we introduce unobserved heterogene-
ity in the form of nite mixtures (Heckman and Singer, 1984). In particular,
we assume that there are K types of individuals, each endowed with a value
of (TRk ; 
W
k ; k; 'ck; !1k; 
S
k ); k = 1; 2; :::;K.
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4.3 Identication
As is the case for most structural models set in an intertemporal framework,
the estimation of our model requires some explicit functional forms.12 For
instance, we make explicit assumptions concerning the form of the utility
function and the distribution of random shocks. Based on these assumptions,
we use panel data to identify the probability of actual choices and outcomes.
Exogenous variation is obtained from time-varying tuition costs, changes in
11The probability of a given type can then be estimated as pk =
exp(qk)PK
j=1 exp(qk)
;where one
of the q0ks is normalized to 0. We employ K = 4:
12Although IV models are typically presented without explicit functional form restric-
tions, their interpretation also require implicit restrictions, which may take the form of
very specic functional form assumptions, cf. Keane (2006).
11
the distance to nearest institution and local unemployment rates (by gender,
region, age and education).13
Tuition fees were introduced starting from 1990 (prior to this year the
training was free of charge) and have been rising (in real 1980 prices) since
then (Figure 5).14
[Figures 4 and 5 about here]
This introduces time and spatial variation, which helps in the identica-
tion of the non-pecuniary part of the model.
4.4 The Likelihood Function
For a given set of parameter values, one can solve the inneroptimization
problem using backward recursions. Then, given a set of actual observed
choices, the likelihood of these choices is computed (in an outeralgorithm).
The likelihood consists of four parts:15
(a) The probability of observing a particular sequence of choices. This
sequence can be expressed as products of marginal probabilities, con-
ditional on the unobserved heterogeneity components, TRk and 
W
k ,
and is denoted L1(k).
(b) The probability of completing training in 2 or 3 periods conditional
on entering into training, denoted L2(k).
(c) The joint densities of observed wages from  = 1 until nperi (the num-
ber of periods in which individual i is observed), at observed wage w ,
which can be factored as the product of a normal conditional proba-
bility multiplied by the marginal wage density f(), denoted L3(k).
13 In particular note that only about half of the institutions that o¤er Part I of the
training program also o¤er Part II (Figure 4). This change in distance to Part II institu-
tions provides variation, which should be helpful for identication. However, empirically
it turned out not to be signicant and it was therefore excluded from the estimation.
14Note that prices di¤er between institutions. This could raise a concern for quality
di¤erences in the training also. However, a recent report from the Ministry of Education
concludes that dispite the substantial di¤erences in tuition costs there appears to be no
quality di¤erence across institutions (MoE, 2000).
15Details of how the model is solved and how the likelihood is constructed can be found
in Appendix A.
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(d) The probability of having a college degree (i.e. endogenizing the initial
conditions), denoted L4(k).
The k-index represents the discrete type mixture for the unobserved
heterogeneity components. Hence, the log-likelihood to be maximized is the
product over types
Ln L = ln
4X
k=1
pk  L1(k)  L2(k)  L3(k)  L4(k): (5)
5 Estimates of the Structural Model
The presentation of the structural parameter estimates is split into 4 di¤er-
ent sets; those pertaining to the non-pecuniary costs of training (Table 2),
the wage equation (Table 3), the continuation probability and initial condi-
tions (Table 4) and the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity components
(Table 5).
[Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5 about here]:
5.1 The Cost of Training
Given the additive form of the Utility function, negative parameter esti-
mates for the non-pecuniary utility components, equation 2, indicate that
an increase in a specic variable tends to decrease the utility of training
(increase the psychic cost). We note that the results indicate that the inci-
dence of training increases with the local unemployment rate and decreases
with tuition. Other things being equal, those who were older when they
terminated Part I are less likely to enrol in Part II.
Interestingly, the e¤ect of accumulated education (the college indicator)
on the net utility of training is signicantly negative for alle four types (the
weighted average is equal to -0.81). This does not necessarily imply that
education increase the psychic cost of training. To see the argument, one
has to re-interpret the negative e¤ect of education as a composite e¤ect
on distinct components of the per-period utility of training. For instance,
the utility of training may incorporate (i) a pure consumption value of the
training cost (prestige associated with training, etc.), (ii) a component that
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reects psychic learning costs, or (iii) a component that measure the e¤ect of
education on time availability for training (for instance, reduction in leisure
may be higher for college educated).
Finally, the utility (or the cost) of training decreases (increases) with the
number of young children.
5.2 The Wage Equation
Estimates of the wage equation are found in Table 3. The individual-specic
return to college completion (ranging from 0.01 to 0.17) indicates a large pre-
mium to college completion. The population average return is equal to 0.15.
When reported on a per-annum basis, these estimates imply wage returns to
education (ignoring the e¤ect of education on the return to training) ranging
roughly between 4 percent and 5 percent per year.
Not surprisingly, training completion is also associated with a relatively
high wage return. For those who have completed high school, the returns
range between 0.09 and 0.28. As Part I does not result in a diploma part of
these estimated returns to Part II (vis-à-vis Part I) may also be returns to
credentials.
For those who have completed college, the return to training is magnied
by 0.10 (weighted average across types), after conditioning on unobserved
heterogeneity. The population average of the individual-specic return to
training is 0.14. Evidently, individual di¤erences in returns to training are
dominated by individual permanent endowments.
Returning to the issue of complementarity, our estimates indicate a sta-
tistically signicant degree of complementarity between schooling and train-
ing. Interestingly, complementarity di¤ers markedly in magnitude across
the four types ranging from zero (type 3) to 022 (type 2).
5.3 The Continuation Probability and Initial Conditions
The estimates in Table 4 show that there is considerable heterogeneity in
the time required to complete Part II of the training program. As expected,
older and more experienced workers appear to complete the program faster
than younger and less experienced workers. Moreover, the duration of Part
II is longer for those who took longer time to complete the rst part of the
training program.
The initial condition equation indicates, as is known in most countries,
that the probability of graduating from college is highly correlated with
parentseducation. Unobserved heterogeneity is also found important.
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5.4 The Heterogeneity Distribution
A thorough review of the main heterogeneity components (utility of train-
ing, utility from college and training, return to college, return to training
and complementarity in training) and their standard deviations reveals a
fair degree of cross-sectional dispersion in individual endowments. This is
particularly true for the individual returns to training (the !1i) with a stan-
dard deviation equal to 0.09 and the complementarity parameter ('ci) with
a standard deviation equal to 0.12.
Individuals of types 1 and 4 are endowed with the highest utility of train-
ing (lower learning cost) as well as the highest returns to college (these types
also constitute the majority of the population, about 85%). This may be
interpreted as evidence that both the wage return to college and the psychic
costs of training are a¤ected by skills that are academic in nature. However,
ignoring the e¤ect that schooling may have on returns to training, the wage
return to training appears to be higher for those who are endowed with
lower utility of training (types 2 and 3). This result is not surprising within
a coherent behavioral model. A high positive correlation between utilities
and returns (to training) would most likely imply a very large incidence of
post-schooling training. Obviously, the frequency of post-schooling train-
ing predicted by the model is naturally limited by the observed frequencies
in the data, since structural parameters must maximize the likelihood of
observing the data (including training decisions frequencies).
6 Discussion
We now discuss a few issues that are naturally raised in the present context.
In particular, we consider (i) the degree of heterogeneity bias that would
prevail if we estimated the wage equation by OLS, (ii) the dynamic e¤ects
of schooling on post-schooling wage growth (the return to training), and (iii)
the e¤ect of an increase in training costs (tuition).
6.1 Heterogeneity Bias
One of the advantages of estimating a structural dynamic model with un-
observed heterogeneity is that the estimated parameters of the Mincer wage
regression are interpreted as causal e¤ects net of heterogeneity bias. For
instance, in the context of a model with endogenous schooling decisions and
exogenous post-schooling wage growth, a structural model o¤ers an explicit
opportunity to quantify the classical ability bias.
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In the present model, the OLS bias is a complicated quantity. The di¤er-
ence between OLS estimates and their true population counterpart depends
on multi-variate heterogeneity (individual wage intercept, individual returns
to college, and individual returns to training). It is therefore interesting to
compare our estimates of the return to training and education (and possibly
interactions) with parameters from an OLS regression.
Overall, the degree of heterogeneity bias appears to be important. The
OLS estimate of the e¤ect of college on earnings - equal to 0.91 - is about
6 times as high as the average type-specic estimates. On the other hand,
the OLS estimate of the return to training, around 0.13, appears to be only
slightly smaller than the true average return to training (about 0.14).
Interestingly, the OLS estimate of the e¤ect of schooling on the return
to training is negative and therefore does not suggest any complementarity.
The estimate, which is equal to -0.33, when compared to the average type-
specic structural estimate (0.10), may be interpreted as evidence in favor
of important heterogeneity bias.
6.2 The Explanatory Power of Schooling on Individual Re-
turns to Training
As noted earlier, di¤erences between individual returns to training of college
graduates and high school graduates should be a¤ected by the causal e¤ect
of schooling on training returns as well as a composition e¤ect. To verify this
claim and in order to quantify the importance of complementarity, we regress
individual-specic returns to training on a college completion indicator. To
compute individual returns, we needed to simulate schooling outcomes by
type so as to recover the relationship between individual endowments and
schooling.
Perhaps surprisingly, this regression indicates that the di¤erence in re-
turns between college graduates and high school graduates is around -0.24.
In other words, high school graduates have higher returns to training, even
though the true causal e¤ect is positive 0.10 (on average). This indicates
the importance of self-selection. If many individuals endowed with a high
level of labor market skills (including a high return to business training) stop
at high school, the results may display a large di¤erential between college
and high school graduates in terms of returns to business training. Yet, this
di¤erential is not inconsistent with a positive causal e¤ect of education and
training.
This regression also allows us to decompose the variance of individual
returns to training into two components; unobserved skills and accumulated
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schooling. The resulting R2; equal to 0.26, indicates that di¤erences in
schooling explains one fourth of the distribution of individual wage returns
to training. The rest is explained by individual specic permanent endow-
ments. This appears to be true whether or not we condition on individual
endowments.
This result is consistent with the importance of persistent unobserved
heterogeneity displayed in the distribution of individual endowments. As the
degree of cross-sectional dispersion in individual skills and tastes is relatively
high, increasing the level of schooling for a randomly selected individual will
only have a limited e¤ect on the return to training. This type of result is
common in structural models that allow for individual heterogeneity.16
6.3 Increasing Training Tuition
In order to illustrate the role of heterogeneity in training enrolment, we sim-
ulated an increase of DKK 10,000 in training tuition.17 The reactions to
such a hypothetical policy depend on a number of individual-specic fac-
tors, such as non-pecuniary utility from attending training and the nancial
benets of such activities. On average, the fee increase resulted in a drop
in (predicted) enrolment by about 25 percent. The decrease in enrolment
varies considerably across individual types, with Type 3 showing the largest
drop (26.1 percent) and Type 1 individuals showing the smallest drop (23.3
percent). From the structural estimates, we know that Type 2 individuals
receive the least non-pecuniary utility from attending Part II of the train-
ing program while Type 4 individuals receive the most utility. At the same
time, the wage gain from training is lowest for Type 4 individuals and sig-
nicantly higher for Type 2 individuals. Hence, in this particular example,
the di¤erence in reactions to a fee increase is mainly driven by di¤erences
in non-monetary utilty from attending training.
Obviously, these results are highly dependent on the partial equilibrium
nature of our model. In a general equilibrium framework, increasing ac-
cess to post-schooling training would not only a¤ect the composition of the
population of participants, but would also a¤ect wage and training policies
adopted by rms. As a result, these e¤ects should really be understood as
upper bounds.
16For instance, Keane and Wolpin (1997) document that increasing college attendance
subsidies would be relatively ine¤ective for the US, precisely because school attendance is
primarily explained by individual unobserved factors that are already determined by age
16.
17 In 2007 prices.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated the causal e¤ect that schooling may
have on subsequent wage gains following training. Specically, we investi-
gated the complementarity hypothesis and found that training seems to be
slightly more benecial to college graduates than to high school graduates.
The result of signicant complementarity found here does not apply to all
other types of training and as such the results cannot be interpreted as evi-
dence of complementarity in general. The key contribution of this paper is
the proposed model, which yields consistent estimation of returns to both
education and training without imposing separability between schooling and
training.
Obviously, the results reported herein apply to a context where the post-
education training course itself has an academic component. In the present
context, education and training seem to represent activities that are close
in nature.
At this stage, several questions remain unanswered. While education has
a small causal e¤ect on the wage gain associated to Part II of the program,
it may still be true that it has major e¤ect on the probability of entering, or
completing, Part I. If so, it appears important to model training decisions
from the beginning of the program.
It should be understood that we have investigated only one type of en-
dogenous post-schooling activities (namely training) by which education can
a¤ect post-schooling wage gains. However, within a dynamic skill accumula-
tion framework, accumulated education can a¤ect (positively or negatively)
the psychic cost of a large number of other post-schooling activities, or in-
crease its associated wage gain. As the range of post-schooling investment
opportunities is wide, it is unlikely that the econometrician can access data
on all relevant investment outcomes, cf. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000).
This conjecture presents major challenges to applied econometricians. In
the presence of any type of post-schooling dynamics, the logic behind IV
strategies collapse, and structural modeling becomes more complicated.18
Our plan is to address this fundamental issue in the near future.
18See Belzil and Hansen (2008).
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A Appendix: The Solution Algorithm and the Log-
likelihood
A.1 The Solution Algorithm
The value function of going into training can be written as (omitting indi-
vidual index i)
V TRt (st) = U
TR
t + E[Vt+1(st+1) j st; d = 1] + "Wt + "TRt ; (A1)
and the value function of not going into training is given by
V Wt (st) = U
W
t + E[Vt+1(st+1) j st; d = 0] + "Wt ; (A2)
where U
TR
signies the deterministic part of the utility function.
The probability that an agent enters into the second part of the train-
ing program in period t equals the probability that V TRt (st) > V
W
t (st) or
equivalently that "TRt > V
W
t (st)   V TRt (st), where V TR denotes the deter-
ministic part of V TR, i.e. V
TR
t (st) = U
TR
t (st) + E[Vt+1(st+1) j st; d = 1],
and similarly for V
W
t :
In order to evaluate the expected value function, we need to integrate
out the period-specic shocks ("Wt ; "
TR
t ). As the shocks are assumed to be
iid normally distributed, we can use the law of iterated expectations and
write (omitting time index t) E(V TR) = Pr[V TR()  V W ()]  E[V TR j
V TR > V W ]: These two terms can in turn be written as:
Pr[V TR  V W ] = Pr
"
"TR
TR
>
V
W   V TR
TR
#
= 
"
V
TR   V W
TR
#
(A3)
and
E(V TR j "TR > V W   V TR) = V TR +
24 

V
W V TR
TR

1  

V
W V TR
TR

35 TR : (A4)
see e.g. Wooldridge (2002).
21
Similar derivations for E(V W ) = Pr[V TR() < V W ()]E[V W j V TR <
V W ] yields
Pr[V TR() < V W ()] = 1  
"
V
TR   V W
TR
#
(A5)
and
E(V W j "TR > V W   V TR) = V W +
24 

V
TR VW
TR

1  

V
TR VW
TR

35 TR (A6)
Collecting A3-A6 we can compute the EMAX[] given by
EMAX[V TR(); V W ()] = Pr[V TR()  V W ()] E[V TRjV TR > V W ] +
Pr[V TR() < V W ()] E[V W jV TR < V W ]: (A7)
A.2 The Log-Likelihood
As outlined in section 4:2, the log-likelihood can be written as Ln L =
ln
X4
k=1
pk  L1(k)  L2(k)  L3(k)  L4(k):
(a) L1(k) is the probability of observing the actual choice path for a
given individual, conditional on the unobserved heterogeneity components.
L1(k) = Pr[(d1(k) = 1); (d2(k) = 1); (d3(k) = 1); (d4(k) = 1)].
(b) L2(k) is the probability of completing training in 2 or 3 periods con-
ditional on entering into training. We may write this part of the likelihood
as
L2(k) = I(enter part II)( [3]
p3 (1  [3])(1 p3)), where  [3] denotes the
probability that training lasts 3 periods (conditional on ever entering), and
where p3 denotes an indicator=1 if actual duration was 3 or more periods and
zero otherwise. The probability is parameterized as 3 = 30+31(Duration
of Part I) + 32(Experiencej).
(c) L3(k) is the joint probability of being in the labor market in year
 + 1, at observed wage w+1. Hence L3(k) = f(w+1)  f(w+2)  f(w+3) 
f(w+4)... f(wnperi); where nperi denotes the number of periods in which
individual i is observed.
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(d) L4(k) is the probability of entering with a college degree as initial
value. This part of the likelihood can be written as (

college
college  (1  


college

)(1 college)), where 

college

denotes the probability of having a
college degree upon entering. This probability is parameterized as col lege =
c0 + c1(mothers education) + c2(fathers education):
Note that when wage densities are simulated, we use all available wage
information, i.e. taking into account that the panel is unbalanced.
23
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B Appendix :   Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1    Gross Median Wages 1982-2003, by Education and Training  
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Figure 2    Years between Completion of Part I and Enrollment in Part II, by 
education 
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Figure 3    Duration of Training, by education 
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Figure 4    Location of Institutions Offering Part I and Part II of the Training 
Program, 1980-2004 
 
Notes: “btp1 (x)” indicates that Part I of the program was only offered in some of the years. “btp1 and btp2 
(x)” indicates that Part I was offered throughout all the entire span of years while Part II was offered only in 
some of the years.   
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Figure 5    Tuition Fee for Part II 1990-2007, by main institution (USD 1980 prices) 
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Notes: Prior to 1990 the training was fully financed by the public. To get 2007 prices, multiply with a factor 
2.7, i.e. the tuition fee in 2007 was about USD 7,000-10,000 in real 2007 prices. 
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Table 1    Number of Individuals, by Education and Training  
No Yes Total
High School 565 2,089 2,654
College 222 635 857
787 2,724 3,511
Part II Training
 
Note: Conditional on experience=7 years. Altogether there are 3,527 individuals in the sample, and about 
54,000 observations. 
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Table 2    Non-pecuniary Utility of Attending Part II of the Training 
Parameter Estimate Std. Err. t-value
constant type 1 18.509 0.055 336.356
constant type 2 16.638 0.039 422.603
constant type 3 17.378 0.097 179.569
constant type 4 18.689 0.085 221.249
local unemployment rate 0.021 0.006 3.516
cohort 0.034 0.018 1.945
copenhagen (0/1) -0.074 0.017 -4.362
age when completing Part I -0.198 0.004 -46.063
single -0.054 0.026 -2.037
number of children -0.186 0.040 -4.659
duration of Part I training -0.011 0.002 -6.375
tuition (1,000 DKK) -0.151 0.020 -7.572
college (0/1), type 1 -0.818 0.138 -5.944
college (0/1), type 2 -1.385 0.198 -7.001
college (0/1), type 3 -0.199 0.010 -20.131
college (0/1), type 4 -0.794 0.137 -5.811  
Notes: copenhagen and single are indicator variables. duration of Part I training is measured in months and 
tuition is measured in 1,000 DKK (1980 prices). 
 
Table 3    Wage Equation Parameters 
Parameter Estimate Std. Err. t-value
wage constant, type 1 11.556 0.010 1157.045
wage constant, type 2 10.830 0.013 856.604
wage constant, type 3 11.930 0.016 746.161
wage constant, type 4 11.275 0.008 1334.856
college, type 1 0.174 0.026 6.617
college, type 2 0.005 0.030 0.182
college, type 3 0.099 0.027 3.643
college, type 4 0.168 0.019 9.094
experience 0.083 0.002 52.452
experience-squared -0.002 0.000 -19.945
training Part II, type 1 0.156 0.010 15.895
training Part II, type 2 0.243 0.014 17.804
training Part II, type 3 0.282 0.014 20.510
training Part II, type 4 0.091 0.009 10.480
complementarity term
training Part II x college, type 1 0.087 0.023 3.796
training Part II x college, type 2 0.222 0.027 8.154
training Part II x college, type 3 -0.066 0.071 -0.922
training Part II x college, type 4 0.119 0.016 7.388  
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Table 4    Remaining Parameter Estimates 
Parameter Estimate Std. Err. t-value
σ-ξ 0.907 0.020 44.581
σ-w 0.425 0.001 294.388
prob(duration > 2 years)
    duration constant, type 1 -1.676 0.060 -28.007
    duration constant, type 2 -1.850 0.009 -216.172
    duration constant, type 3 -1.303 0.069 -18.870
    duration constant, type 4 -1.543 0.064 -24.028
    experience -0.189 0.018 -10.463
    duration of Part I training 0.009 0.003 3.322
prob(college degree)
    college constant, type 1 -1.837 0.043 -43.118
    college constant, type 2 -1.563 0.058 -26.968
    college constant, type 3 -1.382 0.066 -20.912
    college constant, type 4 -1.770 0.043 -41.371
    mothers education 0.120 0.018 6.879
    fathers education 0.063 0.014 4.446  
 
 
Table 5    Type Probabilities 
qk Std. Err. t-value pk
type 1 -0.337 0.069 -4.907 35.49%
type 2 -1.843 0.090 -20.571 7.87%
type 3 -1.968 0.108 -18.152 6.94%
type 4 0.000 (normalized) --- 49.70%  
 
Where 
∑ == 4 1 )exp(
)exp(
j j
k
k
q
qp . 
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C Appendix:   Model Validation 
 
 
Table C1   Observed and Predicted Enrolment, in percent 
Period Observed Model prediction
1 66.6 57.9
2 4.17 3.6
3 1.02 3.4
Sum 71.8 64.9  
 
 
 
